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Introduction
The Internet has become a central element of the Chinese govern-ment’s ambitious reform agenda as presented in the Third andFourth Plenums of the 18th Party Congress. In March 2015, Premier
Li Keqiang unveiled the “Internet Plus” plan, an ambitious agenda that
leverages the power of information technology for economic growth and
development. (1) A specific, elaborate implementation plan was published
in July. (2) Similar, more detailed plans address the development of sectors
as diverse as e-commerce, online finance, and tech entrepreneurship. Big
data has been enlisted in an effort to enhance the Party’s governing ability. 
Nevertheless, following the accession of the Xi leadership in 2012, the
Internet and information technology were viewed with considerable sus-
picion. Social media had provided a platform for raucous political debate,
criticism of Party authorities and revelation of corruption and official
abuses. It was also seen as a channel for “foreign hostile forces” (guowai
didui shili 国外敌对势力) to undermine China’s political stability. Conse-
quently, significant institutional, regulatory and policy changes were made
in order to regain control over the Internet and pave the way for the
strategies outlined above. A new Central Committee apparatus was cre-
ated, led by Xi Jinping personally. Second, new rules were introduced for
the domestic Internet, ranging from social media and audio-visual content
to technology suppliers. 
This paper will review these changes and discuss their implications for
the role of the Internet in governance and social management. This taps
into two academic debates and two important policy areas that are in-
creasingly coalescing: the notion of the Internet as a space for communi-
cation and organisation on the one hand, and information technology as a
facilitator of government intervention, surveillance, and control on the
other. 
Increasing censorship during the second half of the Hu era notwithstand-
ing, the Internet became a vibrant space for social interaction and public
exchange with, as Hu Yong phrases it, a “cacophony” (xuanhua 喧哗) of
voices. (3) Scholars have disagreed about the degree of intentionality with
which this space was created or condoned. Jonathan Sullivan, for instance,
claims that social media tools enabled the Party to better monitor its
agents and respond to particular, specific concerns while ignoring their
systemic causes. (4) Rebecca MacKinnon, for instance, argues that Internet
blogs could serve as a “safety valve” by permitting opinions and dissent to
be vented before they transform into mobilisation or political action. (5)
Others, such as Milton Mueller (6) and Li Yonggang, (7) argue that the state’s
response to Internet developments was more characterised by improvisa-
tion and learning in continuously changing contexts. Nevertheless, most
scholars agreed that the leadership’s attitude towards the public discourse
element of the Internet, and particularly social media, was ambivalent. In
Alice Miller’s view, this was one of the major symptoms of the political
stasis that characterised the second half of the Hu administration. (8)
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Such ambivalence is completely absent from the state’s stance on the
technological and economic aspects of Internet development. As Gudrun
Wacker already claimed in 2003, a Promethean optimism about the trans-
formative role of technology in development, going back to the early days
of industrialisation in late-Qing China, is common in Chinese governing
circles. (9) Through state-funded initiatives, such as the 863 programme and
the indigenous innovation agenda, China has sought to rapidly enhance
domestic high-tech capabilities. Informatisation (xinxihua 信息化), the
process of enhancing economic efficiency, improving governance, and
strengthening social services through the application of information tech-
nologies, has been a priority for more than a decade. (10) Information tech-
nology was listed among the “Four New Modernisations” that the new
leadership put forward in January 2013, mere weeks after its installa-
tion. (11) As Duan Qing demonstrates, the pursuit of informatisation has
also influenced the interaction between the leadership and private enter-
prise, enabling the rise of a class of IT leaders. These leaders do not pose a
direct challenge to the regime, and in fact, have mutually overlapping in-
terests in fostering economic growth and strong domestic companies.
Nevertheless, they do constitute a somewhat autonomous community,
making possible a considerable presence of private actors in an economic
sphere critical to political stability: the Internet is the only “commanding
height” (zhigaodian 制高点) where large private enterprises play a signifi-
cant role. (12) Yet here also, the authoritarian calculus influences outcomes.
As Greg Austin claims, overriding concerns about information control have
stunted the development of the information society. Often merited dis-
trust about government-produced content created a toxic environment
“awash in supposition, half-credible news stories and libel,” (13) while the
state security system has consistently undermined the development of se-
curity technology and encryption, contributing to a growing cybercrime
scourge. 
This paper will argue that the changes brought by the Xi administration
sought to achieve three major goals. First, with regard to social media, it
sought to change the public nature of the online sphere, ending the am-
bivalence of the Hu era. The potential for mobilisation, association, and
large-scale communication on social media was seen as a potential risk,
yet at the same time provided valuable information on public opinion to
the leadership.  Consequently, instead of largely open and interactive
media, such as Weibo, the leadership implicitly supported more private
platforms, such as WeChat, where surveillance remains possible. Second,
the administrative restructuring of the Internet governance apparatus can
be seen as an effort to centralise leadership over this important sphere,
transcending interdepartmental boundaries and interests, and creating di-
rect links to the summit of political power. Lastly, the efforts intended to
signal the importance the leadership attributes to information technology,
and to lay the groundwork for the continued and accelerated adoption of
information technology in all areas of socio-economic governance. 
Organisational change
The Xi administration took two major organisational steps in its reform
of Internet governance. First, it established a presidential-level policy co-
ordination unit called the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and In-
formatisation. Second, it greatly enhanced the authority of the State Inter-
net Information Office. These two bodies have separate, but interrelated
lineages. The Central Leading Group is the latest iteration of an organisa-
tional reform process that sought to lead and coordinate the development
of China’s information society, including technological development, eco-
nomic success, and security, as well as online content. The State Internet
Information Office, on the other hand, was established within the propa-
ganda apparatus in order to provide a more coherent basis for the control
of online content. (14) These two bodies have been combined into a struc-
ture not unlike other Party-state “systems” (xitong 系统). (15) The process of
transformation is nevertheless unfinished, and it remains to be seen ex-
actly how decision-making patterns and powers crystallise.
As Internet technology developed, various pieces of its functionality
came under the purview of actors from different “systems.” Some of the
first rules on Internet use were promulgated by the Ministry of Public Se-
curity, as these concerned the integrity and security of information net-
works. (16) Reflecting the Internet’s roots in scientific research, the China In-
ternet Network Information Centre (CNNIC) was established under the
aegis of the Chinese Academy of Science and the Ministry of Information
Industry (MII). The CNNIC is responsible for domain name registration and
IP address allocation, as well as the issuance of trust certificates. The emer-
gence of an Internet economy largely dominated by private enterprises led
to the establishment of the Internet Society of China in 2001. The ISC acts
as an intermediary organ linking the Internet industry to government, and
has a regulatory role through the self-disciplinary documents it publishes.
On the governmental side, a new ministry in charge of telecommunica-
tions, the Ministry of Information Industry, was created in 1998 through
the merger of, amongst others, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunica-
tions and the Ministry of Electronics Industry. Furthermore, different func-
tional bodies, including the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Televi-
sion (SARFT) and the General Administration of Press and Publications
(GAPP), were given primary review powers. 
A successive series of bodies was established to lead and coordinate the
activities of these bodies, with their portfolio growing and their bureau-
cratic position increasing as time went by. A pre-existing interministerial
joint conference was transformed into the State Council Leading Group for
Informatisation Work (Guowuyuan xinxihua gongzuo lingdao xiaozu 国务
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院信息化工作领导小组). This was chaired by Vice-premier Zou Jiahua, and
included not only representatives from the economic, scientific, and tech-
nological sectors, but also from the two media departments, the PLA’s
General Staff Department, and the Ministry of Public Security. (17) This
Leading Group was merged into the newly established MII in 1998, but a
similar group was again established the year afterwards under Vice-pre-
mier Wu Bangguo. (18) In 2001, the group was raised from the vice-premier
level to premier level, with a corresponding change in the ranks of its
members. (19) It was also given an office in charge of daily affairs, which
was merged into the newly-established Ministry of Industry and Informa-
tion Technology (MIIT) in 2008. As Austin argues, the focus of these insti-
tutions gradually changed from technology and an information economy
to a more broadly defined notion of an information society. (20) Still, other
Party bodies had a considerable influence on Internet development as
well. Concerning content, the most important of these was the Central
Propaganda Department (Zhongyang xuanchuan bu 中央宣传部), which
extended its control over the network through its subordinate ministries,
including SARFT and GAPP, as well as the State Council Information Office
(SCIO). (21)
This structure was problematic in two respects. First, it saw protracted
administrative turf battles and departmental protectionism. The creation
of the MII in 1998 was partly pushed by escalating tensions between the
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications and the Ministry of Electronics
Industry, and especially the fledgling telecommunications operators each
had established. (22) It took years of intra-ministerial negotiation (23) before
the State Council, in 2010, could announce concrete trial measures to in-
tegrate China’s telecommunications, cable television, and Internet net-
works. (24) At the time of writing, a national cable operator has been estab-
lished, and a number of pilot projects have been launched, yet “three-net-
work convergence” (sanwang ronghe 三网融合) remains more an aspira-
tion than a reality. (25) In the area of content, a spat over online gaming li-
censing privileges between GAPP and the Ministry of Culture led to a five-
month shutdown of China’s most popular online game, World of War-
craft. (26)
Yet at the same time, there were also blind spots in regulatory terms,
which became particularly visible in the area of content. The propaganda
system primarily considered the Internet as merely a new publishing or
broadcasting platform. The main thrust of their regulatory approach was
therefore a relatively simple extension of the management model and
repertoire of propaganda techniques that had been developed for the on-
line incarnations of traditional media, such as online videos, news, and
blogs. Yet this approach was not adapted to the emergence of Web 2.0 ap-
plications such as microblogs and other social communication tools that
facilitated novel forms of interaction. The extent to which netizens turned
into content creators and the speed at which information could “go viral”
seems to have come as a surprise to the authorities. The Ministry of Indus-
try and Information Technology was in nominal charge of regulating “on-
line information services.” (27) However, MIIT was not primarily a censor-
ship body, and the relevant regulations had not been revised since 2001. (28)
Moreover, coordination between various local public security, media, and
Internet information offices with regards to censorship policy was also
often lacking. 
Initial measures to counter this situation were already taken before the
18th Party Congress. Most importantly, the State Internet Information
Office (SIIO, Guojia hulianwang xinxi bangongshi 国家互联网信息办公室)
was established in 2011. At that time, it was essentially subordinate to
the SCIO and did not have independent staffing. Two full-time vice-di-
rectors were appointed in 2012. The first, Peng Bo, had a background in
the publishing sector and the SCIO’s Internet management department,
while the second, Wang Xiujun, had been chief engineer at MIIT. The SIIO
grew in stature and importance during the Xi administration’s first year,
in tandem with a series of campaigns aimed at bringing social media
under control. Most importantly, it gained independent leadership, as
Beijing municipal propaganda chief Lu Wei was appointed director in the
spring of 2013. In October, he gained a third deputy named Ren Xian-
liang, previously a propaganda cadre in Shaanxi. Furthermore, as part of
a ministerial streamlining, SARFT and GAPP merged in the summer of
2013. (29) This reduced administrative overlap and ensured that the re-
sulting State Administration for Press, Publications, Radio, Film, and Tele-
vision (SAPPRFT) would be better able to cope with a converged media
environment.
Reorganisation was not limited to the executive level. In keeping with the
“top-level design” (dingceng sheji 顶层设计) theme espoused in the Third
Plenum, further restructuring affected leadership and coordination of
cyber affairs. On 27 February 2014, the first meeting of a new central co-
ordinating body for Internet governance took place in Beijing. The new
Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatisation (Zhongyang
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wangluo anquan he xinxihua lingdao xiaozu中央网络安全和信息化领导小
组) was chaired by Xi Jinping himself, and its membership included depart-
ments across the spectrum of propaganda, economic management, and
political affairs (See Table 1). It inherited the portfolio and membership of
the previous premier-level group, with the addition of the governor of the
People’s Bank of China.
The Office of this new leading group, in charge of daily administrative
work, was established within the SIIO, which was re-established as an in-
dependent entity and gained a new English name: Cyberspace Administra-
tion of China (CAC). In August 2014, a State Council notice announced the
CAC would be responsible for the governance of all online content. (31) Sub-
ordinate technical and advisory bodies such as CNNIC, ISC, and the Advi-
sory Council on State Informatisation now report directly to the CAC. (32)
In this way, the structure of Internet governance has now taken the form
of an independent xitong, resembling the propaganda system. The Leading
Group and the CAC are in charge of technological and infrastructure de-
velopment and security, countering cybercrime, and managing interna-
tional relations in the area of cybergovernance. Illustrating this broad
reach, the CAC is currently in charge of drafting a comprehensive national
strategy for information technology and cybersecurity, which will provide
the blueprint for policy in this area for the next decade. (33)
Some observers have suggested that this new xitong is now outstripping
the traditional propaganda apparat in power and importance. (34) Certainly,
its power and position has increased significantly. The restructuring of the
Leading Group means that Internet governance has been brought from the
more technocratic State Council and MIIT into the centre of political deci-
sion-making. It also fits in with a broader trend to locate more authority
within Party bodies rather than state bodies. Both Xi Jinping and Lu Wei
have brought a more activist stance to Internet governance, in contrast
with the more typical reticence of Party officials. (35) Nevertheless, ques-
tions remain as the practical implementation of the restructuring contin-
ues. One particular matter is the authority structure between the CAC, the
Leading Group, and other CCP systems. The relationship with the propa-
ganda bureaucracy, for instance, is unclear. On the one hand, the CAC
started out as a subordinate department within this system, and as vice-
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Special feature
Names Titles
Xi Jinping (Chair) General Secretary, PRC President
Li Keqiang (Vice-Chair) Premier
Liu Yunshan (Vice-Chair) Chief Secretary, CCP Central Secretariat; Chairman, Central Ideology and Propaganda Leading Group
Lu Wei (Head, Leading Group Office) Director, Cyberspace Administration of China
Ma Kai Vice-Premier
Wang Huning Director, CCP Policy Research Office
Liu Qibao Director, Central Propaganda Department
Fan Changlong Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission
Meng Jianzhu Director, Central Political-Legal Committee
Li Zhanshu Director, CCP General Office
Yang Jing Secretary General, State Council
Zhou Xiaochuan Governor, People’s Bank of China
Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs
Fang Fenghui PLA Chief of Staff
Lou Jiwei Minister of Finance
Cai Wu Minister of Culture
Yuan Guiren Minister of Education
Miao Wei Minister of Industry and Information Technology
Guo Shengkun Minister of Public Security
Xi Shaoshi Chairman, National Development and Reform Commission
Wang Zhigang Party Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology
Cai Fuchao Director, State Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television
Table 1 – Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatisation Membership (30)
director of the Central Propaganda Department, Lu Wei still reports to its
head, Liu Qibao, and the Standing Committee member with the propa-
ganda portfolio, Liu Yunshan. On the other hand, as director of the CAC, Lu
Wei reports directly to Xi Jinping. The CAC has also made some very visible
inroads into traditional propaganda territory. In April 2015, for instance, a
new research body, the Chinese Culture Institute of Internet Communica-
tion (Zhongguo wenhua wangluo chuanbo yanjiu hui 中国文化网络传播研
究会) was established under CAC authority. In foreign affairs, the CAC and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have sent separate delegations to interna-
tional cybergovernance events such as the Hague Global Conference on
Cyberspace, (36) raising questions about authority structures in interna-
tional affairs. The assignment of tasks, departments, and personnel be-
tween MIIT and the CAC remains in process. (37) In other words, while the
objective of this reorganisation may have been to centralise leadership
power over cyber affairs, it still remains the case that the leadership will
require the collaboration of individual agencies for policy implementation
and execution. This, in turn, means that the perennial principal-agent and
coordination issues that have plagued Internet governance thus far are
likely to continue, albeit on reorganised lines.
Internet policy change
The domestic measures taken in Internet reform cannot be seen in iso-
lation from the manner in which the Xi administration has framed its
broader challenges, as well as its overall, comprehensive reform agenda. As
indicated earlier, the Xi administration came to power with an agenda of
countering what had become perceived as a crisis both in governing the
Party and in state-society relations, as well as an increasingly hostile inter-
national environment. As a result, the techno-optimist discourse that had
developed around the informatisation agenda was joined by a more secu-
rity-oriented focus. Rhetorically, Internet authorities sought to portray
themselves as a benevolent Leviathan preventing harm to Chinese citizens
emerging from online swindles and blackmail, as well as from the social
chaos that would follow from ideological destabilisation. This discourse of
security was used to justify a progressive series of measures to counter po-
tential domestic and international threats affecting online content as well
as hardware and infrastructure. 
Content 
The expansion of Internet use in China is a well-known story. User num-
bers grew to 649 million at the end of 2014, and the demographic com-
position of Internet users shifted as rural, less well-off citizens gained ac-
cess, often through mobile technology. (38) Social media and self-media
permitted individual citizens to participate in public discourse to an un-
precedented extent, rendering visible political discontent, drivers for
protests, and individual instances of abuse. Social media-based stories
grew in prominence on the Chinese Internet, from reports on incidents
such as the Wenzhou rail crash (39) to rumours about an attempted military
coup in Beijing. Also, the Internet became a platform for humorous satire
and parody, exemplified by the creative use of language and imagery under
the symbol of the Grass Mud Horse (caonima 草泥马). (40) Online celebri-
ties and public intellectuals, nicknamed Big Vs, became opinion leaders,
often having tens of millions of followers. (41) The speed and extent to
which information could spread on open platforms, such as social media,
made it nearly impossible for management authorities to maintain control
over sudden incidents and trending content. 
The leadership had already started responding to these trends before the
18th Party Congress. Online censorship gradually expanded in step with In-
ternet usage, and the establishment of the State Internet Information Of-
fice in the same year signalled a recognition of the Internet’s importance
in public communication. Yet these responses were very much informed by
traditional propaganda practices and tactics. For instance, the Sixth
Plenum of the 17th Party Congress was dedicated to culture and propa-
ganda issues, but addressed Internet-related questions in only one para-
graph of its comprehensive Decision. Instead, it was held that traditional
persuasion- and culture-based propaganda was necessary to provide Chi-
nese society with the necessary spiritual nourishment. The new Internet
governance administration sought to tackle these perceived threats in a
manner that was much more based on the characteristics of online com-
munication. The first challenge was to defuse the tensions that had arisen
on online social media and regain control. This proceeded in an ostensibly
well-planned, gradual manner. In April, the Internet was identified in a se-
cret Party document as the prime platform through which harmful infor-
mation entered into public discourse. The justification for this document
was provided by an acrimonious online debate about constitutionalism
and the nature of CCP governance. (42) In August, the newly-appointed SIIO
director Lu Wei introduced Seven Baselines (qige dixian 七个底线) for on-
line opinion leaders, which were later expanded to all online users. Later
that month, Xi Jinping gave a secret speech at a national conference on
propaganda and ideology work where he called upon cadres to “unsheathe
the sword” (liangjian 亮剑) in a new public opinion struggle with the Inter-
net as its main battlefield. (43) This led to a broad crackdown in which a
number of Big Vs were arrested, and new rules were promulgated that im-
posed prison sentences on online postings that were retweeted 500 times
or more. (44) These measures explicitly targeted the volatility and publicity
of a medium like Weibo, and hastened an exodus from public microblog-
ging platforms to private messaging apps. Weibo use dropped precipitously
in the space of a mere month. (45) Having thus dealt with the primary prob-
lem, the leadership moved to consolidate a new regulatory model for so-
cial media and news. Furthermore, regulations concerning online culture
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were strengthened as well. The following sections will address these sec-
tors in detail.
Social media and news: The reforms in the area of social media had two
main focal points. First, official voices were to gain more prominence in the
online sphere, while non-official voices were to be co-opted into subscrib-
ing to the “Seven Baselines.” Second, rules concerning real-name registra-
tion were strengthened and, in contrast to earlier periods, more strongly
enforced. (46) Such rules directly counter online anonymity, making it easier
to identify and prosecute sources of unwanted content. 
As the ideological campaign deepened in 2013, more and more users
left the public Weibo platform in favour of Tencent’s WeChat service. (47)
For most users, WeChat is a much more private environment, with a
maximum chat group size of 100 members. This means that while infor-
mation can still circulate, it does so more slowly, and out of the public
view. (48) It is also possible to register for a public account, but these are
limited to one message per day – limiting the potential of non-Party
voices to take a leading role in public debates. Yet these limitations did
not forestall further government intervention and regulation. In March,
dozens of politically active public accounts across the ideological spec-
trum were deleted, including those belonging to liberal-leaning organisa-
tions such as Phoenix WebMedia (Fenghuang weimeiti 凤凰微媒体) and
the leftist website Utopia (Wuyouzhixiang 乌有之乡). (49) New rules on
instant messaging services introduced in August 2014 imposed manda-
tory real-name registration obligations for all users. These rules also re-
quire instant messaging companies to examine all applications for a pub-
lic account, and categorise them according to the sort of information
they would disseminate. The dissemination of current affairs-related in-
formation and news was only permitted to specific licensed bodies, and
no other public account holders were permitted to publish or retweet
such content. (50) The real-name registration elements of these rules were
deepened in early 2015, in regulations that also required users of all ac-
count-based online information services to commit to the Seven Base-
lines and the well-known list of prohibited content categories that had
been included in all important media regulations. (51) The Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court furnished a further incentive for websites to maintain real-
name registration information by imposing liability on service providers
who are unable to provide the identity and contact method of defen-
dants in Internet-related tort cases. (52)
As these new regulations curtailed the activities of posters not associ-
ated with official Party media, official voices moved in to take their
place. As early as April 2013, Ren Xianliang, a Shaanxi provincial propa-
ganda official who would shortly after be promoted to Lu’s deputy, had
developed a theory of “two public opinion fields,” the traditional media
field of Party outlets, and the new media field emerging on the Internet.
In Ren’s diagnosis, chaos reigned in the Internet sphere, and traditional
media were castigated for failing to adapt to new circumstances. (53) In
April 2014, Central Propaganda Department head Liu Qibao announced
a plan for the convergence of traditional media with the online environ-
ment, and guiding opinions to this effect were passed by the Central
Leading Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform in August. (54)
As put in a People’s Daily editorial published on the same date, “Media
communication work essentially is the work of creating people’s
thoughts. Invisible propaganda is the most brilliant communication. Co-
ercion is ineffective; only by bringing life as the spring breeze and rain, by
silently watering everything is it possible to reach people’s hearts.” (55) In
order to achieve these objectives, traditional media enterprises were to
employ methods particularly aimed at the mobile Internet, such as
building apps, to better reach their intended audiences. In connection
with this, new rules also regulated journalism in online news outlets,
clearly defining which kinds of online platform and their staff could pro-
duce current affairs-related content. (56)
The assessment of these measures in the Party press has been largely pos-
itive. By the end of 2014, People’s Daily reported that the “consensus” in the
two public opinion fields had greatly strengthened. (57) A report of the Peo-
ple’s Daily Public Opinion Monitoring Office published in June 2015
claimed that the positions of official mainstream media and public opinion
had increasingly converged, there was an increasing degree of approval for
the government, and that the online public opinion ecology had been put
on “the right track” (zhenggui 正轨). (58) At the moment, strong academic
scrutiny of the reshaped social media environment in China is lacking. Nev-
ertheless, it seems to be the case that the optimistic tone of these official
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reports is not wholly undeserved. While some forms of satire and online
banter persist, social media no longer seem to be the political crucible they
were before the 18th Party Congress. To a certain degree, this may be as-
cribed to the high levels of stress and tensions associated with the Xi ad-
ministration’s unrelenting anti-corruption and anti-dissent campaigns.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether this will remain the case as po-
litical circumstances change – as they inevitably must – in the future. 
Online culture: Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, the promi-
nence of cultural propaganda seems to have diminished somewhat in
the effort to regain dominance over online public opinion. Maria Rep-
nikova and Kecheng Fang suggest that, having dispensed with classical
state-sponsored, top-down cultural products, the new leadership has
adopted a much more participatory approach to online persuasion. (59)
Nevertheless, the traditional cultural bureaucracies, particularly SAP-
PRFT, have sought to maintain at least some level of influence and au-
thority in this sphere. In particular, it has focused its attention on on-
line video and literature. 
In January, SAPPRFT issued a notice outlining its intention to strengthen
respective management over online video. This document obliged produc-
ers to obtain the correct licensing, and imposed producer-like liabilities
onto online video platforms for content produced by individuals. As part of
this, video websites were required to obtain the real identity of such pro-
ducers. (60) In September, SAPPRFT formally enacted new procedures for
censorship of foreign audio-visual content. There had been an obligation
to license imported works used in online broadcast for many years, but this
was honoured more in the breach than in the observance. The new rules
mandated that online video providers had to file annual import plans for
approval, that every newly-imported film or television programme had to
undergo content inspection, and that all relevant information had to be
uploaded to an online registration platform, managed by SAPPRFT. Further-
more, this document introduced an import quota: online video platforms
were only permitted to import a quantity of foreign content equivalent to
30% of the domestically produced content they purchased the preceding
year. (61) Later that month, SAPPRFT issued a notice indicating that videos
featuring stars and celebrities with convictions for drug use, solicitation, or
other crimes could no longer be broadcast. In November, it published reg-
ulations proscribing, amongst others, one-night stands and extramarital
affairs in online videos. (62)
SAPPRFT also intensified the annual campaigns fighting pornography and
other unlawful content online. The 2014 “Clean the Web” (Jingwang 净网)
campaign attracted worldwide headlines when popular and ostensibly
harmless television series such as The Big Bang Theory were banned from
Chinese video websites. Sina lost its audio-visual broadcasting licence
after pornographic content was discovered on some of its services. The
small number of works at issue, four videos and 20 articles, suggests that
this move might have wider motives. Equally, the fact that the banned,
highly popular series were later broadcast in an edited version by CCTV (63)
indicates that state-owned entities may have taken advantage of political
circumstances for economic gain. As the campaign deepened, SAPPRFT
broadened its focus to set-top boxes and mobile video apps. (64) It also
called in the seven TV stations holding online television licences for a crit-
icism meeting, at which it ordered the withdrawal of all unapproved for-
eign channels that these stations broadcast. (65) Lastly, it went after popular
platforms for the distribution of crowdsourced subtitles, including YYeTs
and Shooter.cn, in a further bid to reduce the market presence of foreign
programmes. (66) However, Chinese programmes were targeted as well, as
illustrated by the fact that a popular historical drama on the Tang Dynasty
empress Wu Zetian was pulled from screens, allegedly because of excessive
cleavage. (67) The Ministry of Culture also played a part in the campaign, an-
nouncing punishments for firms including Tencent and Baidu for the
spread of pornographic and gambling games. (68)
While the stress on traditional propaganda approaches was reduced, it did
not disappear from the leadership’s radar. In October, a Forum on Literature
and Art took place in Beijing. In his speech at this event, Xi Jinping stressed
a more conservative, Party-oriented approach to art, calling for “even more
excellent works that disseminate the value views of present-day China, re-
flect the spirit of Chinese culture, mirror the aesthetic pursuits of Chinese
people, and organically integrate ideology, artistry, and enjoyability.” (69)
While his speech, or at least the edited version of it reported by Xinhua, did
not directly reference the Internet, SAPPRFT responded to this speech at
the end of December, with a development plan for the hugely successful
online literature industry. This had hitherto remained under the regulatory
radar, but online literature enterprises would now come under closer regu-
latory scrutiny, with increasing stress on ideological rectitude and the eu-
logy of a particular top-down defined vision of Chinese culture. In particu-
lar, the role of literary commentary and criticism would be strengthened,
while authors would be subject to a real-name registration system. 
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Technological security
In conjunction with the content regulation reforms outlined above, sig-
nificant attention has also been directed at the extent to which China’s re-
liance on foreign technology might provide channels for infiltration and
subversion by “foreign hostile powers.” In spite of plans existing since the
1980s (in particular the 986 project), China still relies on foreign suppliers
for the absolute majority of its hardware and software. This was thrown in
painful relief through events such as the discontinuation of support for
Windows XP in April 2014 and the Snowden revelations, which created
considerable concern about China’s perceived inability to stand up to the
technological superiority of, in particular, the United States. (70) Red Flag
Magazine, for instance, published an article in which individuals from Na-
tional Defence University warned about the possibility of solar-powered
drones off the coast of China providing connectivity to dissidents in the
coastal regions. (71)
In response, the leadership initiated a broader push to speed up the Sini-
fication of ICT resources and to gain more influence over the products
and services of US technology companies. One raft of measures was
taken days after US Department of Justice indicted five PLA officers as-
sociated with the Shanghai-based unit 61398, which was identified as the
perpetrator of consistent cyberespionage attacks in the 2013 Mandiant
Report. On one day, 27 May, reports emerged that a proposal to review
the security of server equipment in the financial sector would be submit-
ted to the Central Leading Group, (72) that state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
were required to sever ties with foreign consulting companies due to sus-
picion that the latter conducted intelligence-gathering on behalf of the
US government, and that the People’s Bank of China and the Ministry of
Finance were encouraging banks to replace IBM servers with domestic
hardware. On the same day, the server manufacturer Inspur announced a
plan to replace IBM hardware in the small server market. (73) Furthermore,
mere days after the indictment was announced, the Chinese government
procurement authorities announced that the purchase of computer hard-
ware running the Windows 8 operating system would be prohibited. (74)
In the area of software, 2014 saw the release of a new mobile operating
system, the Linux-based China Operating System. This was developed by
the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Shanghai-based Liantong Net-
work Communications Technology. It was announced that the system was
tested on China Mobile and China Telecom networks, was compatible with
Java and HTML5, and supported more than 100,000 existing applications.
According to Chen Feili, a deputy general manager of Liantong, the ulti-
mate objective is to make COS into China’s main operating system, and to
broaden its reach to laptop and desktop platforms. (75) But COS is not
alone. Also in January, Coship Electronics launched its native mobile oper-
ating system 960OS, (76) while progress was also announced on Ubuntu
Kylin, (77) a desktop OS developed by a UK software firm under the auspices
of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Advances were
also made in server hardware. The firm Sugon, previously known for its pro-
duction of supercomputers, announced that it had successfully developed
and manufactured servers based on the Long Xin 3B eight-core proces-
sor. (78) It is claimed that this processor, whose intellectual property rights
are wholly Chinese, will be included in hardware in the military, financial,
and other sectors, and reduce China’s reliance on imported microchips. 
Together with these import substitution measures, the government
also threw up increasing regulatory barriers for foreign technology. In
May, the CAC announced a comprehensive security review system for
“important technologies and services used in systems concerning na-
tional security and the public interest.” (79) In December, Apple CEO Tim
Cook agreed with Lu Wei that Apple’s products would be subject to
these security audits. However, foreign technology companies and com-
mercial associations also protested against new regulations issued by
China’s banking regulator. These require companies selling computer
equipment to Chinese banks to submit source codes and provide back
doors into hardware and software. Furthermore, 75% of technology
products used in Chinese financial institutions must become “secure
and controllable” by 2019. (80) In the area of government procurement,
a number of US technology firms were removed from approved govern-
ment procurement purchasing lists, most prominently affecting the
sales of Cisco equipment. (81) Unsurprisingly, these measures have at-
tracted mixed responses from foreign observers, in particular the West-
ern companies that see their business threatened through import sub-
stitution preferences.
The government also launched broader initiatives in the area of cyberse-
curity, with a particular focus on the security of mobile applications. A
campaign targeting mobile malware started in April, (82) while in August,
MIIT published a comprehensive security plan for the online environ-
ment. (83) This plan not only called for more effectively controllable soft-
ware and hardware, but also for better personal data protection and better
security management for app stores. A first cybersecurity week was organ-
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ised in October 2014 in order to raise the population’s awareness about
personal data protection and online fraud, as well as harmful information.
In the wake of this event, a self-regulatory convention for information-
based apps was promulgated in Beijing. (84) A draft anti-terrorism law,
promulgated in November, also required that data concerning telecom-
munications and Internet services must remain within the borders of
China. (85) But perhaps the most influential measure in the long run will be
the social credit system announced in June. The ultimate objective for this
system is to use big data to measure citizens’ trustworthiness across a
range of indicators, including online discipline. (86) This would not merely be
a tool for surveillance, but also a digital Panopticon-like stimulant for ne-
tizens’ self-restraint. 
Conclusion
To recapitulate, 2014 was a pivotal year for cybergovernance in China in
many ways. It saw an institutional reconfiguration with the intention of
overcoming departmental boundaries and creating direct links between
central authority and the levers of cyber power. A much more ambitious
tack was taken in terms of content governance as well as control over
technologies and suppliers. China also strengthened its international pres-
ence, making its agenda more prominent and building a modicum of sup-
port among other nations. 
These changes are not important for their content per se; few of the
measures and initiatives announced and undertaken were completely new.
The groundwork for both the CAC and the Leading Group was laid in the
previous decade. The technological indigenisation plans draw back on a de-
velopment programme, the 863 Programme, initiated in 1986. (87) Real-
name registration has been an aspiration for at least a decade. (88) The so-
cial media crackdown can be drawn back to the Sixth Plenum of 2011, and
even to patterns of censorship and communication management drawing
back to the Democracy Wall movement in 1979. The online literature de-
velopment plan reads mostly like the development plans for other cultural
industries that have been published over the last ten years. 
What has changed, however, is the importance that information technol-
ogy has in the eyes of the central leadership in many areas of social con-
trol, political reform, and economic development. Informatisation is no
longer seen as an add-on to traditional policy tools and practices, but as a
core facilitator of a new governance approach based on ubiquitous sen-
sors, IT terminals, big data, and cloud storage. This approach is illustrated
in the social credit scheme, which leverages data generated at multiple
points to create a new structure for behavioural “nudging.” (89)
Yet the realisation of these bold objectives may prove difficult. A first
problem is that bureaucratic interests continue to diverge. While the cre-
ation of the Central Leading Group and the CAC ensures that all bureau-
cracies involved in Internet governance are at least sitting around the
same table, considerable differences of opinion concerning strategy and
policy remain. The leadership’s attitude against Internet corporations re-
mains ambivalent. On the one hand, China’s Internet giants are presented
as national champions and examples of China’s growing capacity for inno-
vation. Yet on the other hand, they are regularly and publicly tapped on the
fingers for small offences. Recently, central Party media criticised the dom-
inant presence of the three giants Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent as an oligop-
oly that impeded the emergence of new industry entrants and fostered
anti-competitive behaviour. (90)
But perhaps most crucially, the importance of the CAC seems to fluctu-
ate. With the reform of online content regulation largely complete, its
prominence in cyber policy-making has diminished in comparison to the
State Council and the National People’s Congress. The Internet Plus
agenda, and the subsequent development plans for the e-commerce, e-
government, and big data sectors originate from the State Council and
contain few references to the CAC. In the explanatory document for the
Cybersecurity Law draft published in the summer of 2015, the NPC only
mentioned in passing that the CAC had been part of an international con-
sultation process. In the meantime, the announced new national cyber-
strategy has not been published, in part due to continued debate on
whether its orientation should be primarily to foster economic and com-
mercial development or to ensure ideological and technological secu-
rity. (91) It thus seems that, like the broader situation, China’s Internet gov-
ernance regime will remain unsettled for the near future. 
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